Raw LLM Responses

> Namely, if the theist wants to say that it actually would be morally right to allow slavers to kidnap children, for example, then they are denying many (if not all) of our commonsense moral judgments. I think Aquinas had an answer for this that went along the lines of, "Human beings may not allow evil because they cannot bring good out of evil. God's greatness is so great that he can bring good out of evil; thus it is moral and good for him to permit actions that humans ought to stop." I don't think this gets around the epistemic question of how we know, or why we should believe, that God is good (much less that there is a God in the first place). But it does weaken the "commonsense moral judgments" part of your E argument, essentially by pointing out the limits of our intuition when applied to a being that is claimed to be omni/limitless/infinite.