RL-SYS The AI system itself

Responsibility Attribution for AI-Mediated Damages with Mechanistic Interpretability · Lena Kästner; Johann Cordes; Herbert Zech · 2026

“Though causation is considered a necessary condition of responsibility and liability (Sect. 2), it may not be sufficient. For instance, identifying relevant difference-makers may not automatically reveal the actor in command of them (see also Sect. 4.3); or we might find that no (human) actor is actually in command of the difference-maker in question. To this end, multi-agent models, Markov-models and game-theoretical methods might be extremely useful [2,52].”

why coded: The responsibility-gap case named from within legal scholarship: no human in command of the difference-maker · unit #11, pp. 197

Moral Responsibility Without Moral Agency (Palgrave Handbook Ch 18) · Nikhil Mahant · 2026

“Call this the 'Agential View' of moral responsibility: according to the Agential View, for an entity to be morally responsible, it is necessary that it is a moral agent. The necessity of moral agency for moral responsibility ('Agency Condition') can be a substantial thesis only if it is not taken to be analytically true.”

why coded: The Agential View named - the premise beneath both gap-talk and human-transfer inferences · unit #1, pp. 273

“[Agency features] seem unrelated to the notion of moral responsibility. Thus, the Agency Condition puts a stricter requirement on moral responsibility than is justified. One way to get around this problem is to make the notion of 'moral agent' a technical one by stipulating a definition. However, [...] this alternative is no more methodologically [sound].”

why coded: The burden argument: agency features unrelated to responsibility's conceptual role · unit #2, pp. 274